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DISCUSSION OF FPECENT DECISIONS
ATTORNEY AND CLIENT-THE OFFICE OF ATTORNEY-WHETHER OR
NOT PERSON NOT LICENSED TO PRACTICE LAW IAY APPEAR IN A
REPRESENTATIVE CAPACITY BEFORE AN ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL-The
perplexing question of whether the conduct of a layman engaged in
handling proceedings before an administrative tribunal involved him in
the unauthorized practice of law was the problem before the Nebraska
Supreme Court in the case of State ex rel. Johnson v. Childe.' The
defendant therein, charged with contempt of court for practicing law
- Neb. -, 23 N. W. (2d) 720 (1946).
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without a license, had on various occasions appeared on behalf of interested
parties before the state railway commission. It was shown that such
appearances necessitated the preparation of pleadings, the examination
and cross-examination of witnesses, as well as the discussion of legal
questions raised at the hearings, all of which services were performed by
the defendant without the aid of a regularly admitted member of the bar.
The defendant was adjudged guilty of contempt by a divided court, the
majority stating: "It is the character of the act and not the place where
it is performed that constitutes the controlling factor. A dissenting
opinion, however, was based on the idea that the act of initiating, as well
as that of conducting, hearings before an administrative body charged
with the sole function of aiding the legislature to fix transportation rates
was not to be considered as falling within the realm of legal practice.
While courts at an early date may have felt that the practice of law
required appearance, on behalf of a party, before a judicial tribunal of
record,3 the modern view, at least as to matters other than those which
involve appearance before administrative tribunals, takes into considera-
tion the nature of the act performed.4  Thus it has been said that the
giving of legal advice, the preparation of legal instruments,' the soliciting,
settling, or adjusting of personal injury or other claims,6 and the doing
of other acts customarily performed by lawyers, 7 constitute the practice
of law. The latter would seem the more logical view since it is universally
known that the greater portion of the attorney's work is, of necessity,
done outside the courtroom. The search for applicable law, the drafting
of pleadings, and the preparation for argument are all done in the
attorney's office or library while only the culmination of these labors is
presented to the court of which he is an officer.
Logical reasoning of this character, however, has been disregarded when
it has become necessary to decide the character of similar acts performed
before administrative tribunals. The legislatures of certain of the states,
for example, have enacted that laymen may appear in a representative
- - Neb. - at -, 23 N. W. (2d) 720 at 723.
3 Porter v. Bronson, 29 How. Prac. 292, 19 Abb. Prac. 236 (New York. 1865). See
also cases collected In an annotation to In re Duncan, 83 S. C. 186, 65 S. E. 210
(1909), to be found in 18 Ann. Cas. 658.
4 People v. Goodman. 366 Ill. 346, 8 N. E. (2d) 941 (1937) ; State v. Richardson,
125 La. 644, 51 So. 673 (1910) ; Shortz v. Farrell, 327 Pa. 81, 193 A. 20 (1937).
5 People v. People's Stock Yards State Bank. 344 Ill. 462, 176 N. E. 901 (1931)
State v. Richardson, 125 La. 644, 51 So. 673 (1910).
6 Smith v. Illinois Adjustment Finance Co., 326 IIl. App. 654. 63; N. E. (2d) 264
(1945); Fitchette v. Taylor, 191 Minn. 582, 254 N. W. 910, 94 A. L. R. 356 (1934).
7 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945. Ch. 32. § 411. and Ch. 38. § 298; Thompson's Conis. Laws,
New York 1939, Penal Law § 270.
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capacity before some of these bodies.' The Federal government, in much
the same way, has given laymen the privilege of appearing before the
Interstate Commerce Commission,9 the Commissioner of Patents," the
Treasury Department," and the Board of Tax Appeals. 2  Attempts to
criticize such statutes have been rejected, at least as to appearances
before the Interstate Commerce Commission, on the ground that it has
rules of procedure distinct from those followed in courts even though
its proceedings involve legal questions and its decisions are published
much like those attained by courts.
13
Statutory provisions of this character can hardly be said to provide
the answer to the problem for they consider only the fact that the
administrative tribunal may have a different modus operandi and
completely disregard the nature of the acts to be performed by laymen.
They may also be of doubtful constitutionality for it was indicated, in
People v. Goodmam,14 that neither the legislature nor the administrative
tribunals could bestow privileges on one not duly licensed if, to do so,
permitted him to engage in activities which the judicial department had
declared to be encompassed within the practice of law, hence falling under
the control of the judicial rather than the legislative department.
15
Other attempts to arrive at a solution to the problem have been made
by classifying administrative agencies according to their function or
character. Bodies such as the Interstate Commerce Commission, the
Commissioner of Patents, the Treasury Department, the Board of Tax
Appeals, the Federal Trade Commission, the Securities and Exchange
Commission, public service commissions, minimum wage boards and the
like have been said to be of legislative or executive character, while
industrial boards or workmen's compensation commissions have been said
8 Thompson's Cons. Laws, New York 1939, Work. Comp. Law, § 24-a, and Wis.
Stat. 1931, § 102.17, authorize persons, firms, corporations, and other agents to
appear before workmen's compensation boards on behalf of claimants. A California
statute, Deering Cal. Laws 1931, Art. 4747, § 15, subsequently altered by constitu-
tional amendment, Cal. Const., Art. 20, § 21, made similar provision. It was held, in
Eagle Indemnity Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 217 Cal. 244, 18 P. (2d) 341
(1933), that but for such statute the layman would be engaged in the unlawful
practice of law.
949U. S. C. A. §17(12).
1035 U. S. C. A. § 11.
11 5 U. S. C. A. § 261.
12 26 U. S. C. A. § 1111.
"3Louisville & Nash. R. Co. v. Sloss-Sheffield S. & I. Co., 295 F. 53 (1923), affirmed
in 269 U. S. 217, 46 S. Ct. 73, 70 L. Ed. 242 (1925).
14366 111. 346 at 352, 8 N. E. (2d) 941 at 945 (1937).
15 Chicago Bar Ass'n v. United Taxpayers of America, 312 Ill. App. 243, 38 N. E.
(2d) 349 (1942).
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to possess judicial or at least quasi-judicial functions.16 The inference
to be drawn from any such system of classification is that questions
relating to the unauthorized practice of law can only arise in connection
with work done before the latter institutions.
A review of the decisions goes far in upholding such a view, for the
cases treating the layman's conduct before administrative tribunals as
amounting to the practice of law all concerned appearance before work-
men's compensation boards,17 while the opposing cases involved activity
before bodies whose character or function might well be designated as
legislative or executive.1 8 As the latter cases give no consideration to
the nature of the acts being performed, being content to hold that the
agencies were "administrative" ones, they imply that it is impossible
for a layman to be engaged in the practice of law when appearing before
them. In only one case, that of Public Service Traffic Bureau v. Haworth
Marble Company,19 is there any recognition of the possibility that the
layman might be engaged in the practice of law if he contemplates more
than merely appearing before the agency. In that case, a contract for
services was held void not so much because the plaintiff corporation had
appeared before the Interstate Commerce Commission but rather because
the compensation for the services was to be based on a percentage of
the "recoveries." As the court concluded that an "award" by the
Commission was not the proper subject for a "recovery" of money, it
deemed that the contract contemplated suit before the courts as well as
appearance before the commission, hence involved the practice of law.
Neither the enactment of statutes purporting to authorize the appear-
ance of laymen nor the classification of tribunals according to their
character or function provide a satisfactory solution. Both present an
arbitrary means of hurdling the vital question, for they turn a blind eye
and a deaf ear to the basic issue, i.e. just what is the layman doing before
the agency. While there is every reason to support the view that ad-
ministrative bodies should not be tied to methods of procedure which
16 Yosemite Lumber Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 187 Cal. 774, 204 P. 226
(1922) ; Western Metal Supply Co. v. Pillsbury, 172 Cal. 407, 156 P. 491 (1916);
Shortz v. Farrell, 327 Pa. 81, 193 A. 20 (1937). See also 42 Am. Jur., Public Ad-
ministrative Law, § 107.
17 People v. Goodman, 366 Ill. 346, 8 N. E. (2d) 941 (1937); Michigan State Bar
Ass'n v. McGregor, 14 Mich. S. B. J. 145 (1934) ; State Bar of Oklahoma v. Waldron,
D. C. Tulsa County No. 60630 (1935) ; Shortz v. Farrell, 327 Pa. 81, 193 A. 20
(1937) ; State ex rel. Daniel v. Wells, 191 S. C. 468, 5 S. E. (2d) 181 (1939).
1SWardman v. Leopold, 85 F. (2d) 277 (1936) ; Schroeder v. Wheeler, 126 Cal.
App. 367, 14 P. (2d) 903 (1932) ; Croker Nat. Fire Prev'n Engineering Co. v. Harlem
French Cleaning & Dyeing Works, 132 Misc. 687, 230 N. Y. S. 670 (1927); Tanen-
baum v. Higgins, 190 App. Div. 861, 180 N. Y. S. 738 (1920) ; Public Service Traffic
Bureau, Inc. v. Haworth Marble Co., 40 Ohio App. 255, 178 N. E. 703 (1931).
1940 Ohio App. 255, 178 N. E. 703 (1931).
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would curtail their efficacy, it should be remembered that administrative
adjudication takes two phases, to-wit: the informal and the formal. In
the first of these phases, decisions are reached upon inspections, confer-
ences, tests, correspondence or by consent. Perhaps the great mass of
the cases are so terminated and the utility of such procedures, to both
the government and the claimants, cannot be disputed.20 The second or
formal phase is reached only if the informal methods do not dispose of
the problem or, for some reason, are not utilized. Here formal pleadings
are found, testimony is taken subject to cross-examination, briefs on law
and fact are submitted, arguments are heard, and a record is prepared
which may eventually reach the courts.
No practice of law by a layman could be found in the first phase for
the acts there involved are not those performed solely by attorneys nor
do they require special skill or training. But, as applied to the second
phase of administrative procedure, courts could well find the conduct of
the layman to be within the realm of the practice of law regardless of
the nature of the tribunal, hence laymen properly should be excluded
from the performance of the acts there required. One case, that of
Goodyian v. Beall," bears out this analysis. The court there held that
appearance on behalf of a claimant before an industrial commission did
not constitute the practice of law up until the claimant first received
notice of the disallowance of his claim. It can be assumed that such
was the "informal" phase of adjudication. Thereafter, the court said,
rehearing proceedings "do constitute the practice of law and must be
conducted exclusively and personally by an attorney or attorneys at
law duly admitted to practice. "22 Inasmuch as the proceedings thereafter
depend on the contents of the rehearing record,2 3 the "formal" phase
of the proceeding must have been reached and effective representation
would require the skilled services of a lawyer. Viewed in the light
thereof, the holding in the instant case is amply justified even though
the tribunal involved would ordinarily be placed in the legislative rather
than the judicial category.
The passage of the recent Federal Administrative Procedure Act
2 -
has been made the occasion for expressions of concern2 5 because of the
unfortunate -wording of Section 6A thereof. That section declares that a
claimant before any administrative agency has the right to be represented
20 42 Am. Jur., Public Administrative Law. § 113.
21 130 Ohio St. 427, 200 N. E. 470 (1936).
22.130 Ohio St. 427 at 434. 200 N. E. 470 at 473.
2' Ohio Gen. Code 1926, §§ 1465-90.
24 5 U. S. C. A. § 1011 et seq.
27 32 A. B. A..J. 684: 28 Chicago Bar Rec. 115, particularly pp. 117-22.
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by counsel or, if permitted by the agency, by any other "qualified
representative." While it adds that nothing contained therein shall
either grant or deny to a layman the right to appear for or represent
others before any agency or in any agency proceeding, a perusal of the
statute renders it difficult to ascertain wherein any positive change in this
regard has been accomplished save to guarantee to a claimant the right
to be represented by counsel. If courts were encouraged to adopt the
nature of the acts to be performed as a test, laymen could still be barred
from 'practicing law before the federal administrative agencies despite
the ineffectual wording of the statute.
I. D. FASA--N
CRINIINAL LAW-FORMER JEOPARDY-WHETIIER OR NOT ACQUITTAL
ON LESSER CHARGE OF ASSAULT WILL PREVENT SUBSEQUENT PROSECUTION
FOR MURDER BROUGHT ABOUT BY DEATH OF VICTIM AFTER THE EARLIER
A CQUITTAL--The recent case of People v. Harrison' presented not only
a rather rare factual situation but also evoked a decision of first impression
in the law of Illinois. The deceased victim therein had been wounded
in a tavern fracas. The defendant had been indicted for an assault with
a deadly weapon with intent to murder but had been acquitted thereof
during the lifetime of the victim. Approximately eight months after the
wounding, the assaulted person died from the effects thereof so the state
caused the defendant to be indicted for murder. Defendant urged upon
the trial court, both by motion and by offer of evidence, that the former
acquittal was a bar to such prosecution but the contentions were denied
and he was found guilty upon a verdict. On appeal taken directly to
the Illinois Supreme Court,2 it was held that the conviction should be
affirmed.
It would appear, from the statement of facts and the opinion in the
instant case, that the sole theory of the defendant's plea rested upon
the doctrine of double jeopardy. The common-law prohibition against
trying a party twice for the same offense3 is now embodied in both federal4
and state constitutions.5 When seeking to determine whether a second
indictment is based upon the same offense as the first, courts uniformly
test the situation by seeing whether or not the evidence necessary to obtain
1395 Ill. 463, 70 N. E. (2d) 596 (1947).
2 11. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 38, § 7801/.
3 4 Bl. Com. 336.
4 U. S. Const., Amend. 5.
5 See. for example, Ill. Const. 1870. Art. 2, § 10. There is variation in the lan-
guage used in the several state Constitutions, but all give some recognition to the
general idea.
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and support a conviction under the second indictment could have been
sufficient to procure a conviction at the first trial and, if so, will hold that
to prosecute on the second indictment would be to place the defendant
in jeopardy twice.' It has, therefore, generally been held that where a
party is either acquitted or convicted of a lesser crime which constitutes
an essential element or part of a greater offense, that decision serves as
a bar to a subsequent prosecution for the larger crime.' Thus, a former
conviction for an assault has been held to bar prosecution for mayhem ;8
attempting to try a person for assault with intent to commit rape places
him in jeopardy a second time if he has previously been convicted of
assault and battery ;9 and an acquittal on a charge of homicide has served
to bar a prosecution for the larger crime of assassination."
The cases cited by the court in the instant case to the effect that a
conviction of assault during the lifetime of the victim is not a bar to
a subsequent prosecution for manslaughter or murder should the victim
die subsequent thereto are recognized exceptions to the foregoing rule.
Decisions of this character proceed on the theory that inasmuch as no
murder had been committed at the time of the first trial for the lesser
offense, the victim still being alive, no conviction would have been
possible so no jeopardy with respect thereto could have arisen." The
present case discloses a situation falling within this recognized exception
but with a variation seldom found, i.e. the defendant was acquitted of
the lesser offense at the first trial. It has been said that such a situation
is not likely to materialize but, where it does, the rule should not vary. 12
The few cases which have arisen presenting that variation are consistent
6 Campbell v. People, 109 Ill. 565, 50 Am. Rep. 621 (1884): People v. Allen, 368
Ill. 368, 14 N. E. (2d) 397 (1938), noted in 16 CHICAGO-KENT REVIEW 386.
7 Graton v. United States, 206 U. S. 333, 27 S. Ct. 749, 51 L. Ed. 1084 (1907);
State v. Blevins, 134 Ala. 213, 32 So. 637 (1.902) ; Floyd v. State, 80 Ark. 94, 96 S. W.
125 (1906) ; People v. Defoor. 100 Cal. 150, 34 P. 642 (1893) ; Arnett v. Common-
wealth, 270 Ky. 335, 109 S. W. (2d) 795 (1937) : State v. Cheevers, 7 La. Ann. 40
(1852) ; State v. Womdra, 114 Minn. 457, 131 N. W. 496 (1911).
8 People v. Defoor, 100 Cal. 150, 34 P. 642 (1893) : State v. Cheevers. 7 La. Ann.
40 (1852) ; State v. Womdra, 114 Minn. 457, 131 N. W. 496 (1911).
9 State v. Blevins, 134 Ala. 213, 32 So. 637 (1902).
10 Graton v. United States, 206 U. S. 333, 27 S. Ct. 749, 51 L. Ed. 1084 (1907).
11 Diaz v. United States, 223 U. S. 442, 32 S. Ct. 250, 56 L. Ed. 500 (1912) ; Hop-
kins v. United States, 4 D. C. App. 430 (1894) ; State v. Littlefield, 70 Me. 452. 35
Am. Rep. 335 (1880); Commonwealth v. Roby, 29 Mass. (12 Pick.) 496 (1832);
Burns v. People, 1 Park. Cr. (N. Y.) 182 (1848) ; Commonwealth v. Ramunno, 219
Pa. 204, 68 A. 184 (1907) ; McNulty v. State, 110 Tenn. 482, 75 S. W. 1015 (1903) ;
Curtis v. State, 22 Tex. App. 227, 3 S. W. 86 (1886) ; Johnson v. State, 19 Tex. Cr.
App. 453, 53 Am. Rep. 385 (1885).
12 See annotation to Commonwealth v. Ramunno, 219 Pa. 204, 68 A. 184 (1907), in
14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 209 at 210.
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with the statement and with the outcome of the present case." As the
doctrine of double jeopardy makes no distinction between prior acquittal
or conviction, being concerned more with the risk of conviction than
anything else, it would appear, then, from that standpoint that the
decision in the instant case was both correct and proper.
This, by no means, necessarily labels the ultimate outcome of the
case as being correct, for the fact of the former acquittal could have
operated to bar the second prosecution in another way, i.e. by the use
of the findings at the first trial as an estoppel against the state when it
sought to introduce proof at the second one. That the doctrine of res
adjudicata or estoppel by judgment is applicable to criminal cases is
undeniable, 4 and the provisions against double jeopardy do not supplant
it in any particular." Where the latter applies, it of necessity over-
shadows the former' 6 since a finding of double jeopardy removes any
reason for the application of the doctrines of res adjudicata. The
fundamental difference between the two lies in the fact that in double
jeopardy questions there must be an identity of offenses, while such is
immaterial in the estoppel problems for there the determination of any
fact on the merits in a prior action bars further investigation with respect
thereto in subsequent litigation."7
As the latter doctrine applies only as to matters put in issue and
directly determined by the court or jury,"' it is important to determine
exactly what issues were before the court in the first prosecution. In the
present case, the first jury had been confronted with two questions, to-wit:
(1) did the defendant commit acts amounting to the assault charged,
and (2) was the requisite specific intent present in the mind of the
defendant? It is true that no precise facts are ever determined by an
acquittal,'9 for the jury could have found either that no criminal act was
- Reg. v. DeSalivi, 10 Cox C. C. 481 (1857). See also Crawford v. State, 174 Md.
175, 197 A. 866 (1938); Commonwealth v. Jones, 288 Mass. 150, 192 N. E. 522
(1934) ; People v. Warren, 109 N. Y. 615 15 N. E. 880 (1888).
'4 U. S. v. Morse, 24 F. (2d) 1001 (1926) ; Jay v. State, 15 Ala. App. 255, 73 So.
137 (1916); People v. Ashrawy, 130 Cal. App. 145, 19 P. (2d) 536 (1933) ; Com-
monwealth v. Spivey, 243 Ky. 483, 48 S. W. (2d) 1076 (1932) ; Dusenberg v.
Rudolph, 325 Mo. 881, 30 S. IV. (2d) 94 (1930); State v. Heaton, 56 N. D. 357,
217 N. W. 531 (1928). But see Town of St. Martinville v. Dugas, 158 La. 262, 103
So. 761 (1925).
15 Collins v. Loisel, 262 U. S. 426, 43 S. Ct. 618, 67 L. Ed. 1062 (1923) ; United
States v. Oppenheimer, 242 U. S. 85, 37 S. Ct. 68, 61 L. Ed. 161 (1916).
16 Freeman, Judgments, 5th Ed., Vol. II, p. 1364 et seq.
' Jay v. State, 15 Ala. App. 255, 73 So. 137 (1916) ; Commonwealth v. Spivey, 243
Ky. 483, 48 S. W. (2d) 1076 (1932).
"sU. S. v. Morse, 24 F. (2d) 1001 (1926) ; People v. Ashrawy, 130 Cal. App. 145,
19 P. (2d) 536 (1933) ; State v. District Court of First Judicial Dist., 100 Mont. 383,
47 P. (2d) 649 (1935).
19 State v. Coblentz, 169 Md. 159, 180 A. 266 (1935).
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perpetrated or that the required specific intent was lacking, or they may
have found both elements absent. Assuming that the first jury had
concluded there was no act of assault, it would be inconsistent with such
finding to hold the defendant guilty of murder at a subsequent trial for
without the preceding assault there could have been no murder. As was
said in one case, " . . it is clear, if he did not make the assault, he
could not be guilty of that which includes and depends upon the
assault." ' 2 , If it be assumed that the first jury acquitted because the
defendant was found not to possess the necessary specific intent, such
fact might be a handicap to the application of the doctrine of estoppel
in some situations as where the first crime requires a different type of
intent than the second. There is no such obstacle in the present case,
however, for it has been held, in determining whether the defendant
possessed the specific intent required for the aggravated assault charged,
that the test is whether or not a conviction for murder would have been
justified had the victim died.2 ' As the very intent necessary to make
out the crime for which the defendant was acquitted would have to be
shown in order to sustain a conviction for murder, it must be concluded
that, no matter which element the jury found missing in the first prose-
cution, there must have been a negation of at least one of the elements
necessary to sustain the second indictment. The prior acquittal, then,
should have served as a complete defense even if it did not suffice for
purpose of double jeopardy.
It can only be suggested that the attorney faced with a situation like
the one in the instant case should not overlook the second principle.
Should there be no identity of offenses to substantiate a plea of double
jeopardy, the advantage to be gained from the estoppel as to certain
facts already determined is obvious.
W. A. HEINDL
CRIMINAL LAW-NOLLE PIOSEQUi OR DISCONTlNUANCE-WHETHER OR
NOT ENTERING OF UNCONDITIONAL NOLLE PROSEQUI PREVENTS REINSTATE-
53ENT OF THE INDICTMENT AT THE SAIE TERM OF COURT-In the recent
Illinois case of People v. Watson,' the defendant had been indicted on
charges of burglary and larceny. Upon arraignment, the state's attorney
entered a nolle prosequi as to the burglary charge and the defendant
pleaded guilty to the one for larceny. Defendant was sentenced on that
charge and was removed to the county jail to await delivery to the
20 Regina v. Walker, 2 M. & Rob. 446 at 457, 174 Eng. Rep. 345 at 348 (1843),
-! People v. Downen. 374 Il. 146. 28 N. E. (2(1) 91 (1940).
394 111. 177, 68 N. E. (2d) 265 (1946).
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penitentiary. Six days later, while still in the county, defendant again
appeared in court and upon motion of the state's attorney the sentence
on the larceny charge was vacated, that count was nolled, and the burglary
count was reinstated. After defendant pleaded guilty thereto, he was
again sentenced to the penitentiary. Defendant then sued out a writ
of error claiming that inasmuch as the proceedings on the larceny count
had been vacated and inasmuch as the burglary one had been improperly
reinstated there remained no basis upon which he could be legally
detained. His argument was based on the theory that, once the court
allowed entry of the nolle prosequi on the burglary charge, no further
proceedings could be had upon that count and a new indictment was
necessary. It was, however, held that the judgment should be affirmed,
particularly since the order reinstating the cause was entered during the
term and with the defendant's consent. The Supreme Court nevertheless
felt constrained to say that although the procedure was legal it could
not be commended.
Attempts to reinstate pleadings that have once been voluntarily
withdrawn are likely to create problems in both civil and criminal cases.
So far as civil cases are concerned, most of the questions seem to be
well settled in Illinois for common-law rules have been followed in this
state, 2 even after the enactment of the Civil Practice Act, which rules
prevent the plaintiff from reinstating his case unless, at the time of
nonsuit, suitable reservation is made.
3
Reinstatement of a criminal case following the entry of a nolle
prosequi is not, however, quite so simple a matter. If reinstatement
occurs at the same term, there may be reason to find no objection unless
the defendant can show some prejudice to his rights. Certainly, if nolle
and reinstatement of a single count occurs while the trial on other counts
is still in progress it might be said that the court has not lost jurisdiction
to renew the proceedings. Thus, in People v. Caponetto,4 the defendant
had been indicted on four counts, one of which was voluntarily withdrawn
during the course of the trial. It was, however, reinstated upon motion
made during the course of the argument to the jury and verdict and
judgment was predicated thereon. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed
the judgment on the ground that there was no prejudice shown as the
defendant appeared to have been offered every opportunity to present
evidence on that charge. The instant case, the second of the Illinois
2 Weisguth v. Supreme Tribe of Ben Hur, 272 Ill. 541, 112 N. E. 350 (1916).
3 Fulton v. Yondorf, 324 I1. App. 452, 58 N. E. (2d) 640 (1944), noted in 23
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVInw 327. See also Thompson v. Otis, 285 Ill. App. 523, 2
N. E. (2d) 370 (1936).
4 359 I1. 41, 194 N. E. 231 (1934).
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decisions touching on the point, differs from that earlier holding in that
the trial on the remaining count had been concluded for several days
before any attempt was made to revive the charge which had been nolled.
That fact raises the question as to whether or not jurisdiction had been
lost when judgment was entered or whether jurisdiction continued at
least for the remainder of the term.
Decisions elsewhere concede that a case may be reinstated during the
same term of court,5 which decisions accept the general doctrine that, as
the court retains jurisdiction over its judgments, orders and decrees
throughout the term at which they are rendered, there is nothing to
prevent reinstatement.6  Certain of these decisions, however, are at-
tributable to peculiar circumstances found therein which may have
prompted the particular holding. In two of them, the nolle had been
entered by reason of mistake of fact on the part of the prosecutor.7  In
the third, the defendant consented to the reinstatement so was hardly,
in a position to complain.8 It is true that the defendant in the instant
case appears to have waived any objection to the procedure, at least he
did not actively protest, so that may have been a governing factor in the
outcome. Had he objected, the prosecution may have been hard pressed
to find genuine authority to support the proposition that a court retains
jurisdiction over a nolle prosequi order throughout the remainder of
the term at which it is entered.
The tenor of a few of the cases would seem to suggest that a nolle
prosequi constitutes nothing more than a declaration by the prosecutor
that there will be no further proceeding for the time being, hence justifies
a reinstatement at a later time if the prosecutor should elect to revive
the charge.9  Despite the broad language used in such cases, a closer
examination of the facts therein discloses that in each instance the
dismissal was entered with leave to reinstate, so they can hardly be said
5 United States v. Rossi, 39 F. (2d) 432 (1930) ; Condos v. Superior Court, 29
Ariz. 186, 239 P. 1032 (1925) ; State v. Nutting, 39 Me. 359 (1855) ; State v. Lonon,
331 Mo. 591, 56 S. W. (2d) 378 (1932) ; State v. Phelan, 68 Tenn. 241 (1877) ; Parry
v. State, 21 Tex. 746 (1858).
6 State ex rel. Graves v. Primm, 61 Mo. 166 (1875).
7 In United States v. Rossi, 39 F. (2d) 432 (1930), the prosecutor entered a nolle
because he was under the impression that the court had no power to sentence a
fourth-time offender against the liquor laws. Upon learning his mistake, the prose-
cutor reinstated the charge. In Condos v. Superior Court, 29 Ariz. 186, 239 P. 1032
(1925), the nolle was entered because of the prosecutor's belief that the offense
constituted a violation of a statute and that there was insufficient evidence to sus-
tain that charge. When it was discovered that the charge was actually for the
violation of an ordinance, the case was again put on the docket.
s Parry v. State, 21 Tex. 746 (1858).
9 State v. Smith, 170 N. C. 742, 87 S. E. 98 (1915) ; State v. Smith, 129 N. C. 546,
40 S. E. 1 (1901) ; State v. Thornton, 35 N. C. 177 (1852) ; State v. Thompson, 10
N. C. 334 (1825).
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to support the view that jurisdiction is retained, at least for the balance
of the term, over an unqualified dismissal. If the analogy found in civil
cases is to be applied, it would seem that revival subsequent ,to final
judgment would be improper if attempted over the protest of the
defendant.
Reinstatement at a subsequent term has quite generally been denied,
in the absence of reservation of authority, upon the ground that to allow
reinstatement would prejudice the rights of the defendant, particularly
since the prosecution could thereby avoid a speedy trial yet leave the
threat of an existing indictment hovering over the head of the defendant
to fall at the whim of the prosecutor. 10 There are qualifications to such
rule, for it has been held that reinstatement is proper if the nolle has
been entered by one without authority,1 or through mistake on the part
of court officials, 12 and there would seem to be no logical basis for objection
in such situations as a court undoubtedly retains jurisdiction to correct
errors in its own records. The same result has been achieved where the
defendant fled after the case was docketed for trial and the case was
nolled to await his reapprehension.'3 But mistake of fact on the part
of the prosecutor which induces the nolle is not enough to permit re-
instatement of the criminal case'4 any more than it would serve in a
civil suit.
1o Kistler v. State, 64 Ind. 371 (1878) ; State v. Dix, 18 Ind. App. 472, 48 N. E.
261 (1897); Commonwealth v. Smith, 140 Ky. 580, 131 S. W. 391 (1910); Dudley v.
State, 55 W. Va. 472, 47 S. E. 285 (1904) ; Woodworth v. Mills, 61 Wis. 44, 20 N. W.
728 (1884). In the cases of State v. Shilling, 10 Iowa 106 (1859), and State v.
Murrell, 170 Tenn. 152, 93 S. W. (2d) 628 (1936), it does not clearly appear when
reinstatement was sought, but the language used would seem to indicate that rein-
statement at any time after nolle would be improper. Such holdings do not neces-
sarily mean that the criminal is to go unpunished for a new indictment may be
secured so long as jeopardy has not attached: Wolff v. United States, 299 F. 90
(1924) ; Ex parte Foss, 102 Cal. 347, 36 P. 669 (1894) ; State v. Shilling, 10 Iowa 106
(1859); Commonwealth v. Smith, 140 Ky. 580, 131 S. W. 391 (1910); Common-
wealth v. Wheeler & Al., 2 Mass. (Tyng) 172 (1806).
11 In Wing v. State, 31 Ga. 155, 120 S. E. 437 (1923), a subordinate of the prose-
cutor signed and entered the nolle without the knowledge of or authority from the
prosecutor.
12 In Ex parte Altman, 34 F. Supp. 106 (1940), the judge ordered the case dis-
missed in the mistaken belief that there was to be no prosecution. The entry of the
nolle in People v. Curtis, 113 Cal. 68, 45 P. 180 (1896), occurred as the result of the
incorrect recording of an order by the clerk of the court. See also Keokuk v.
Schultze, 188 Iowa 937, 176 N. W. 946 (1920).
13 Southerland v. State, 176 Ind. 493, 96 N. E. 583 (1911).
14In State v. Veterans of Foreign Wars, 223 Iowa 1146, 274 N. W. 916 (1937), the
defendant had been indicted for maintaining a liquor nuisance. Acting under the
impression that the defendant was not incorporated, hence not indictable, the prose-
cutor caused the case to be dismissed. Upon learning that the defendant was actu-
ally incorporated, the prosecutor moved the trial court to reinstate and the motion
was granted. Such action was overruled by the state supreme court. See also Henry
v. Commonwealth, 67 Ky. 427 (1868).
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It may be concluded, therefore, that the problem presented in the
instant case would be likely to result in an entirely different solution if
the defendant does not preclude himself from raising the question by
his own failure to object.
E. W. JACKSON
MASTER AND SERVANT-STATUTORY REGULATION-WHETHER OR NOT
FOREMEN ARE ENTITLED TO ORGANIZATIONAL PRIVILEGES op NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS ACT-The right of foremen to organize and bargain
collectively under the sanctions imposed by the National Labor Relations
Act was recently affirmed by the United States Supreme Court in the
five-to-four decision rendered in the case of Packard Motor Car Company
v. National Labor Relations Board.' The majority of the court upheld
the Board's designation that the Foremen's Association of America was
an appropriate bargaining representative and, as such, was entitled to
recognition by the employer, indicating that while the Packard Motor
Car Company had the right to the whole-hearted loyalty of the foremen
in the performance of their duties, the latter possessed the right to protect
their independent and adverse interests both in the terms of the employ-
ment contract and the conditions of work through the organizational
privileges afforded by the National Labor Relations Act.
The implications arising from such a decision are quite broad,2 but
the fact situation involved is sufficiently complex that the actual contro-
versy resolved embraces a much more restricted result. The employer
involved, typical of modern American big business organizations, was a
highly specialized and substantially productive unit in the automobile in-
dustry.3 The operational activities of the company were supervised and
directed by approximately 1100 foremen.4 They elected to organize under
the aegis of an association which was independent of the rank and file
1329 U. S. -, 67 S. Ct. 789, 91 L. Ed. (adv.) 697 (1947). Douglas, J., wrote a
dissenting opinion concurred in by Vinson, Ch. J., and Burton, J. Frankfurter, J.,
concurred in a part thereof.
2 See dissenting opinion, 329 U. S. - at -, 67 S. Ct. 789 at 794, 91 L. Ed. (adv.)
697 at 701. Certification of a union of foremen by a state labor relations board, a
collateral problem springing from the instant case, has been made the subject of
decision in Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Rel. Bd., 329 U. S. -,
67 S. Ct. 1026, 91 L. Ed. (adv.) 887 (1947).
3 Concededly engaged in interstate commerce, Packard Motor Car Company con-
ducts its principal manufacturing operations in two main plants, broken down into
approximately 20 divisions, which in turn are subdivided into approximately 300
departments employing approximately 32,500 workers.
4 These employees were subdivided into "general foremen," "foremen," .assistant
foremen," and "special assignment men." The general foremen had charge of one
or more departments, with the foremen and assistants ranking below them in the
supervision of the ordinary workers. The special assignment men were trouble-
shooters. While foremen, as a group, received higher pay and other privileges not
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employees,5 and which represented supervisory employees exclusively.
Pursuant to prescribed procedure,6 the Board decided that all the foremen
employed at one of the company's plants constituted a unit appropriate
for the purposes of collective bargaining and certified the association as
the bargaining representative. 7 The company, asserting that the foremen
were not "employees" entitled to the bargaining privileges of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, refused to bargain so the Board issued a
"cease and desist" order." Upon the company's challenge that such order
was invalid, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit decreed
enforcement,9 on which the United States Supreme Court subsequently
granted certiorari with the result already noted. The rather narrow issue
before the court, then, was whether the order of the Board was authorized
by the statute. 10 Reduced to its simplest form the question was whether
the foremen were "employees" within the terms of the act. 1
accorded to the rank and file of employees, all hiring and firing was done by the
labor relations department. The foremen could initiate recommendations for promo-
tion, demotion and discipline, subject to grievance procedures agreed upon between
the company and the union representing the ordinary employees, and were responsi-
ble for maintaining the quality and quantity of production within their various
jurisdictions.
5 The Board, in its holding in In re Packard Motor Car Co., 61 N. L. R. B. 4
(1945), had found that the association was an unaffiliated and independent labor
organization, formed for the exclusive purpose of representing supervisory em-
ployees, as well as that it was appropriate to group the several levels of supervisors
in a single bargaining unit because of an obvious community of interest and lack of
marked disparity In rank among the several levels. It thereby overruled its holdings
in In re Murray Corp. of America. 47 N. L. R. B. 1003 (1942), and in In re Boeing
Aircraft Co., 45 N. L. R. B. 630 (1942).
6 See 29 U. S. C. A. §§ 159-60.
7 61 N. L. R. B. 4 at 26 (1945).
8 64 N. L. R. B. 1212 (1945).
9 Packard Motor Car Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 157 F. (2d) 80
(1946).
10 Much of the dissent, overlooking the fact that it is the province of the courts to
determine legal issues only, i.e. whether there is substantial evidence to support the
ruling or whether the order oversteps the law, proceeds off into the nebulous realm
of industrial policy. It invokes the bogey that a change in the management v. labor
contest necessarily produces a struggle between owners on the one hand and the
operating group on the other. See 329 U. S. - at -, 67 S. Ct. 789 at 794, 91 L. Ed.
(adv.) 701 at 702. Since it was industrial strife, no matter the form, which pro-
duced the National Labor Relations Act in the first instance, anything which, by
democratic means, tends to lessen strife should be regarded as within the spirit and,
in this case, within the letter of the statute.
11 The Board itself had said that there had been a tendency to assume that the
issue was whether foremen should or should not join unions, but pointed out that
such assumption misconceived the Board's function which was simply to decide
whether foremen were entitled to have access to the orderly administrative machin-
ery available to rank and file employees: 64 N. L. R. B. 1212. The lower court
similarly pointed out, 157 F. (2d) 80 at 83 (1946), that the "controlling questions
are: (1) whether the supervisory employees involved herein are entitled to or ex-
cluded from the privileges accorded by the National Labor Relations Act, and (2) if
they are entitled to the privileges of the Act, whether the unit established by the
Board is appropriate to effectuate the purposes of the Act."
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Reference to the National Labor Relations Act itself immediately dis-
closes the striking anomaly that a foreman comes well within the statu-
tory definitions, at least, of both an "employer,"1 2 and an "employee."13
Nor does the context aid materially in determining the line of cleavage
between the two since the statute, as well as those who enacted it, pre-
supposed two diametrically opposed poles, one of management and the
other of labor, to one of which all engaged in industry must of necessity
cling, 14 with no provision for a neutral zone somewhere in between."
Possibly the best clue is given by the use of the word "acting" in the
definition of the term "employer," which tends to emphasize the element
of activity of the individual rather than his mere status or membership
in a particular group. As the purpose of the labor act is to correct the
failure or refusal of industry to recognize the right of workingmen to
bargain collectively, 6 latitude should be exercised in order to bring "work-
ingmen' 17 within the ambit thereof if possible. Since such conduct as
organizing and bargaining by foremen is obviously not "acting in the
interest of an employer," it might be inferred that foremen must neces-
sarily be "employees." But the problem is far too complex to stand upon
such oversimplified grounds.
Turning to earlier judicial determinations, it will be seen that the
anomalous position of supervisory employees is far more apparent. The
bi-polar concept of "employee" and its opposite "employer" has been
abundantly illustrated,18 but the inchoate middle distance is confused
1229 U. S. C. A. § 152(2) defines "employer" as including "any person acting in
the interest of an employer, directly or indirectly," with certain exceptions not here
relevant.
13 "Employee," according to 29 U. S. C. A. § 152(3), includes "any employee," and
Is not to be limited to the employees of a particular employer unless the chapter
explicitly states otherwise. It also includes "any individual whose work has ceased
as a consequence of, or in connection with, any current labor dispute or because of
any unfair labor practice, and who has not obtained any other regular and substan-
tially equivalent employment."
14 See Daykin, "The Status of Supervisory Employees under the National Labor
Relations Act," 29 Iowa L. Rev. 297 (1944). See also 55 Yale L. J. 754, 59 Harv. L.
Rev. 606.
15 There is no specific reference to "foremen" or "supervisory employees" in the
National Labor Relations Act. It is, therefore, unlike the Railway Labor Act, 45
U. S. C. A. § 151, which lists "employee or subordinate official" among the employees
covered thereby. See also the Merchant Marine Act, 46 U. S. C. A. § 1253; the
Social Security Act, 42 U. S. C. A. § 1301; and the Federal Employers Liability Act,
45 U. S. C. A. § 51, for other examples.
16 29 U. S. C. A. § 151.
17 Ibid., § 159(b). In N. L. R. B. v. Armour & Co., 154 F. (2d) 570 at 574 (1945),
the court said: "The term 'employee' was not used by Congress as a word of art.
It is to be given a broad and comprehensive meaning. It takes color from its sur-
roundings and should be read in the light of the mischief to be corrected and the
end to be attained."
, 18 See cases cited by Daykin, "The Status of Supervisory Employees under the
National Labor Relations Act," 29 Iowa L. Rev. 297 at 298-9.
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and largely uncharted. It is true that a number of the decisions which
indicate that, under this very statute, foremen were to be regarded as
"employers" were evolved upon union complaints of interference by such
supervisory personnel in the collective bargaining process,19 interference
which the Board and the courts took extreme pains to prevent under any
guise. Again, the Supreme Court has been careful to point out that
while the determination of facts rests exclusively with the Board, judicial
review being limited to questions of law,2" so that inferences to be drawn
from the facts must also rest with the Board,21 still, as a matter of law,
a broad and enlightened interpretation of the term "employee" is not be-
yond the power of the courts.2 2 The enlarged view taken in the instant
case is not, therefore, an abrupt contretemps, 23 for several previous de-
cisions, at least of lesser courts, have admitted foremen and other super-
visory personnel to collective bargaining rights.
24
'9 Consider International Association v. National Labor Rel. Bd., 311 U. S. 72,
61 S. Ct. 83, 85 L. Ed. 50 (1940), where the court pointed out that even slight sug-
gestions of the employer's choice between unions might have telling effect among
men who knew the consequences of incurring that employer's strong displeasure; or
H. J. Heinz Co. v. National Labor Relations Bd., 311 U. S. 514, 61 S. Ct. 320, 85 L.
Ed. 309 (1940), where the mere fact that the company had not authorized or di-
rected the activities of supervisory personnel in organizing was insufficient to relieve
the company from responsibility. See also National Labor Relations Board v.
Taylor-Colquitt Co., 140 F. (2d) 92 (1941), involving the activities of the wife of the
leading foreman, and National Labor Relations Board v. Link-Belt Co., 311 U. S.
584, 61 S. Ct. 358, 85 L. Ed. 368 (1941).
20 In National Labor Relations Board v. Waterman S. S. Corp., 309 U. S. 206 at
208, 60 S. Ct. 493, 84 L. Ed. 704 at 707 (1940), the court said: "Congress has left
questions of law which arise before the Board-but no more-ultimately to the
traditional review of the judiciary. Not by accident but in line with a general
policy, Congress has deemed it wise to entrust the finding of facts to these special-
ized agencies. It is essential that the courts regard this division of responsibility
which Congress as a matter of policy has embodied in the very statute from which
the Court of Appeals derived its jurisdiction to act."
21 See National Labor Relations Bd. v. Falk Corporation, 308 U. S. 453, 60 S. Ct.
371, 84 L. Ed. 396 (1940); N. L. R. B. v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock
Co., 308 U. S. 241, 60 S. Ct. 203, 84 L. Ed. 219 (1939) ; National Labor Relations .Bd.
v. Penn. Greyhound Lines, 303 U. S. 261, 58 S. Ct. 571, 82 L. Ed. 831, 115 A. L. R.
307 (1938).
22 See National Labor Relations Bd. v. Hearst Publications, 322 U. S. 111, 64 S.
Ct. 851, 88 L. Ed. 1170 (1944), holding that the term "employee" should be under-
stood with reference to the purpose of the act, and the facts involved in the economic
relationship; not to be established technically by previously developed or set legal
classifications. See also National Labor Relations Bd. v. Glueck Brewing Co., 144 F.
(2d) 847 (1944), and Phelps-Dodge Corporation v. National Labor Rel. Bd., 113 F.
(2d) 202 (1940), cert. granted 312 U. S. 669, 61 S. Ct. 447, 85 L. Ed. 1112, modified
on other grounds, 313 U. S. 177, 61 S. Ct. 845, 85 L. Ed. 1271 (1941).
28 30 C. J. S., Employee, p. 226, indicates that the term "employee" has neither
technically nor In general use a restricted meaning by which any particular employ-
ment or service is indicated and "that it may have different meanings in different
connections admits of no doubt." While the term is often "restricted to laborers and
workmen engaged In manual labor . . .yet on the other hand, it may broadly refer
to all persons who work for hire, to skilled labor, or even to the scientist or pro-
fessional man."
24 In National Labor Rel. Bd. v. Skinner & Kennedy Stationery Co., 113 F. (2d)
667 at 671 (1940), the court said: "There is no inconsistency between the provi-
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Nor can it be said that the Board itself has been guilty of narrow con-
sistency in delineating that right. From quite early in its history down
to May, 1943, the Board had permitted such personnel to be represented
by labor organizations for the purpose of collective bargaining with their
employers.2 ' Then came the decision in In re Maryland Drydock Com-
pany,26 in which a union composed exclusively of supervisory personnel
was denied collective bargaining rights..2 7 The front was not kept united,
however, for exceptions were made for the printing
28 and the maritime 29
trades. Although a union of supervisory personnel was allowed to rep-
resent nonsupervisory employees, 30 the Board steadfastly refused to recog-
nize bargaining units composed exclusively of foremen. 1 The first real
break in the doctrine of the Maryland Drydock case occurred just a year
after its formulation. In the case of In re Soss Manufacturing Company1
2
sions of sections 2(2) and 2(3) of the Act, when the facts are taken into considera-
tion. Nothing in the Act excepts foremen from its benefits, nor from the protection
against discrimination, nor from unfair labor practices of the master." See also
National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 154 F. (2d) 932
(1946), recognizing plant guards; National Labor Relations Board v. Armour & Co.,
154 P. (2d) 570 (1945), recognizing plant clerks; National Labor Relations Board
v. Sun Shipbuilding Corp., 135 F. (2d) 15 (1943), holding supervisors to be suffi-
ciently detached from management; Eagle-Picher Mining & S. Co. v. National Labor
Rel. Bd., 119 F. (2d) 903 (1941), treating a graduate chemist, acting as director of
research, to be an employee rather than an executive; National Labor Relations Bd.
v. Am. Potash & Chemical Corp., 98 F. (2d) 488 (1939), recognizing foremen; and
National Labor Relations Board v. Star Publishing Co., 97 F. (2d) 465 (1938),
treating branch managers as employees.
22 See In re Godchaux Sugars, Inc., 45 N. L. R. B. 105 (1942) ; In re Union
Collieries Coal Co., 41 N. L. R. B. 961 (1942). The last mentioned case gave a de-
tailed account of the policy of the Board and listed all of its earlier decisions on
the point.
2649 N. L. R. B. 733 (1943).
27 Board member Reilly seems first to have raised the fear that if a union of
foremen was recognized, the Board "would have to hold, in each case, that the
highest corporate officials were entitled to be included In appropriate collective
bargaining units," for he felt that the foreman's duties made him an instrumentality
of management in dealing with labor.
28 In re W. F. Hall Printing Company, 51 N. L. R. B. 640 (1943), recognized bar-
gaining rights which had been "traditionally exercised by foremen in the printing
trades."
29 In re Ohio Barge Line, Inc., 59 N. L. R. B. 154 (1944). The divergence as to
maritime workers was upheld by the courts. See Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v.
National Labor Relations Board, 146 F. (2d) 833 (1945), cert. den. 325 U. S. 886,
65 S. Ct. 1573, 89 L. Ed. 2000 (1945). That holding proceeds on the idea that the
determination of a proper collective bargaining unit is a function reserved to the
administrative discretion of the Board.
30 In re Revere Copper & Brass, Inc., 51 N. L. R. B. 350 (1943).
31 See In re General Motors Corporation, 51 N. L. R. B. 457 (1943) ; In re Murray
Corporation of America, 51 N. L. R. B. 457 (1943) ; In re Boeing Aircraft Company,
51 N. L. R. B. 67 (1943).
3256 N. L. R. B. 348 (1944). The Board said: "The definitions in section 2 of the
terms 'employer' and 'employee' are not mutually exclusive, and there is judicial
authority for the view that under certain circumstances supervisors may be em-
ployees. .. "
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the Board indicated that mere supervisory status did not, by its own force,
remove an employee from the protection of the national act. The prin-
cipal case followed almost a year later, at which time the Board noted
a retreat from its former stand because it said that the potential dangers
which had required a different position at an earlier date could not ma-
terialize where the union representing the foremen is "independent and
remains so."3
A pattern is thus beginning to take form, one which follows the
original apparent views on the subject.3 4  In the absence of concise leg-
islative definition, a visible and fairly well defined concept is being worked
out. The anomalous position of the foreman, pointed out elsewhere,3"
discloses that he stands today, in relation to mass-production industry,
on a far different plane than the tyrant of earlier days. 36  The restricted,
blind "loyalty" heretofore required of supervisors has undergone liberal-
ization. With respect to matters of wages, hours, and conditions of work,
he owes no duty to his employer for, in this aspect of his relationship, he
deals with management at arms length. He should, therefore, be allowed
to assert the privileges given to all who work in, rather than own, modern
industry.
W. 0. KROHN
NEWSPAPERS-REGULATION AND OFFENSES-WHETHER STATUTE ESTAB-
LISHING COMMERCIAL ADVERTISING RATE AS MAXIMUM RATE FOR POLITICAL
ADVERTISING IN NEWSPAPERS IS CONSTITUTIONAL-The recent New Haip-
shire case of Chronicle & Gazette Publishing Company, Inc., v. Attorney
33 In re Packard Motor Car Company, 61 N. L. R. B. 4 (1945). In subsequent
decisions still further delineation appears. In re B. F. Goodrich Company, 65 N. L.
R. B. 294 (1946), permitted various levels of foremen of the one plant to form a
single appropriate bargaining unit: In re L. A. Young Spring & Wire Corp., 65
N. L. R. B. 298 (1946), indicates that the kind of industry is immaterial for this
purpose; while In re Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 66 N. L. R. B. 386 (1946), seems
to have forgotten about the requirement of "independence" by allowing the same
union to represent supervisors that already represented production workers.
.4 See note 25, ante.
35 War Labor Board, Report and Findings of the Foremen's Panel (1945), p. 39.
indicates that whereas "he was formerly an executive with considerable freedom of
action, he is now an executor carrying out orders, plans, and policies from above:
more managed than managing. more and more an executor of other men's decisions
and less and less a maker of decisions himself."
36 The author of the comment in 55 Yale L. J. 754 at 755 (1946). says: "The
duties of a supervisor in industry today generally are no longer identifiable with the
functions of the traditional foreman. The plenary authority to employ, transfer.
promote, demote, discipline, or discharge subordinates is gone. Particularly in mass
production industries stringent personnel and management policies have relegated
supervisory officials to a position of 'traffic cop.'" See also Daykin, "The Status of
Supervisory Employees under the National Labor Relations Act," 29 Iowa L. Rev.
297 at 313-5.
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Generall involved a petition for a declaratory judgment to determine the
constitutionality of a statute of that state purporting to fix the maximum
rates which newspapers and radio stations could charge for political ad-
vertising.2 The petitioner therein, publisher of an old established news-
paper, filed a schedule of rates pursuant to such statute which schedule
indicated that it charged $1.50 per inch for local rate, $2.00 per inch
open rate, but $3.00 per inch for political advertisements. It published
political advertisements on behalf of, and charged certain of, the defend-
ants the higher rate and thereafter presented its petition for a declaratory
judgment asserting that the statute was unconstitutional (1) because arbi-
trary and without rational basis, (2) because discriminatory since limited
in application to newspapers and radio stations and did not regulate other
forms of advertising and (3) because invading the publisher's right to
freedom of contract and freedom of press. The nisi prius court trans-
ferred the proceeding, without determination, to the Supreme Court of
New Hampshire. That court, by a 3-2 vote, held the statute constitutional.
The United States Supreme Court subsequently dismissed an appeal
from such ruling on the ground that no substantial federal question was
involved.'
The ability of a state legislature, in the absence of emergency, to regu-
late private business through the fixing of rates as an incidental function
to the proper exercise of the police power seems to possess an interesting
historical background. Possibly the earliest demonstration thereof is found
in the English statute 1 Eliz. c. 11, where operators of wharves were sub-
jected to regulation as to unloading and were cautioned that only reason-
able tolls and duties were to be exacted.4 An attempt to formulate the
basis for such action and to postutate a working rule by which it would be
possible to indicate the businesses likely to be subjected to similar rate-
making seems to have been made, also quite early, by Lord Chief Justice
Hale in his treatise De Portibus Maris.5 He indicated that when private
1- N. H. -, 48 A. (2d) 478 (1946). Marble, Ch. J., wrote a dissenting opinion
concurred in by Johnston, J.
2 N. H. Laws 1945, Ch. 185, § 2 states: "No person or corporation, within this
state, publishing a newspaper or other periodical or operating a radio station or
network of stations shall reeeive for political advertising or for political broadcasts.
a rate in excess of the rate or rates regularly charged by such person or corporation
for commercial advertising or for commercial broadcasts of similar character and
classification and no candidate or political committee shall pay for political adver-
tising or broadcasts any rate or charge in excess of such rate or rates regularly
charged."
32- 1. S. -, 67 S. Ct. 485, 91 L. Ed. (adv.) 372 (1947). Justices Douglas. Murphy
and Rutledge were of the opinion that probable jurisdiction should be noted. Re-
hearing has been denied.
4 6 Stat. at Large (Pickering trans.. Cambridge. 1763) p. 137 (1558).
,1 largrave, A Collection of Law Tracts (Dublin, 1787). p. 78.
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property is "affected with a public interest" it ceases to be purely private
property and, according to him, it is deemed clothed with a public interest
when it is used in a manner so as to affect the community. Upon that
rationale, therefore, it was found possible, in Allnutt v. Inglisp' to sub-
ject warehouses to rate-making legislation.
Justice Hale's rule was adopted by the American courts quite early,
7
then was allowed to lapse into disuse until it was resurrected and given
added strength by the decision in Munn v. Illinois.8 In that case, a decision
upholding the right of a state to fix maximum rates for grain elevators, the
doctrine was said to be justified by a "public interest" found to exist in
the facts there presented rather than from any constitutional or statutory
provision. 9 This willingness to enlarge upon the list of businesses which
had thitherto been considered as the only public callings was indicative of
an attitude which other courts were to adopt in the ensuing decades.
Regulation of fire insurance rates was soon permitted," but other statutes
such as those regulating wages in the packing industry," the operation
of private employment agencies, 2 the sale of tickets to private amusement
parks, 3 or the manufacturing of ice 4 were struck down because the busi-
nesses were not "affected with a public interest". Such holdings did
not go without strong dissents. In Tyson & Brother v. Banton,"5 for
example, Justice Holmes commented on that phrase as a test for determin-
ing the validity of price-fixing laws by saying that it was "little more than
a fiction intended to beautify what is disagreeable to the sufferers.""
Justice Sutherland also confessed that it furnished "at best an indefinite
standard."7 In another of these cases, it was Justice Brandeis who noted,
6 12 East 527, 104 Eng. Rep. 206 (1810).
7 In Mayor of Mobile v. Yullle, 3 Ala. 140, 36 Am. Dec. 441 (1841). an ordinance
regulating the price of bread was upheld upon the same basis as would warrant
legislative regulation of "mills, ferries, bridges, turnpike roads, and other kindred
subjects." By section 7 of 3 Stat. 587 (1820). Congress authorized the officials of the
District of Columbia "to regulate ... the rate of wharfage at private wharves ...
the sweeping of chimneys, and to fix the rate of fees therefor."
8 94 U. S. 113, 24 L. Ed. 77 (1877).
9 94 U. S. 113 at 132. 24 L. Ed. 77 at 86.
loGerman Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U. S. 389. 34 S. Ct. 612. 5S L. Ed. 1011
(1914).
11 Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations. 262 U. S. 522. 43 S. Ct. 630,
67 L. Ed. 1103 (1923).
12 Ribnick v. McBride. 277 U. S. 350. 48 S. Ct. 545. 72 L. Ed. 913. 56 A. L. R. 1327
(1928).
13 Tyson & Bro. v. Banton. 273 U. S. 418. 47 S. Ct. 426. 71 T,. Ed. 718 (1927).
14 New State Ice Co. v. Liebinann. 285 U. S. 262. 52 S. Ct. 271. 76 L. Ed. 747
(1932).
- 273 U. S. 418. 47 R. Ct. 426. 71 1.. Ed. 418 (1927).
6 2723 U. S. 41S at 446. 47 S. Ct. 426. 71 L. Ed. 718 at 729.
'7 273 U. S. 418 at 430. 47 S. Ct. 426. 71 L. Ed. 718 at 722.
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in his dissent, that "the notion of a distinct category of business 'affected
with a public interest,' employing property 'devoted to a public use,'
rests upon historical error.'"'1 In his opinion, the true principle should
be that the power of the state extended to every regulation of any busi-
ness reasonably required and appropriate for the public protection.
Modification of the classic rule, suggested as being necessary by these
dissents, eventually was accomplished in the case of Nebbia v. New York. 9
The defendant therein had been convicted of violating an order of the
New York Milk Control Board which had been given the power to fix
milk prices. He sought review before the United States Supreme Court on
the ground that the Milk Control Act was an unconstitutional attempt
to regulate a private calling. While that court admitted that the milk
business did not constitute a public utility, it nevertheless held the statute
constitutional, in reliance upon Munn v. Illinois, 20 on the ground that it
was a business which the public interest demanded should be regulated.
The court said: "It is clear that there is no closed class or category of
businesses affected with a public interest, and the function of courts . . .
is to determine in each case whether circumstances vindicate the challenged
regulation as a reasonable exertion of governmental authority or con-
demn it as arbitrary or discriminatory . . . The phrase 'affected with a
public interest' can, in the nature of things, mean no more than that an in-
dustry, for adequate reason, is subject to control for the public good. "21
Only if the price-control legislation is arbitrary, discriminatory, or demon-
strably irrelevant to the policy sought to be effectuated, then, can there
be any expectation that it may be declared unconstitutional.
Since that decision, a mass of state legislation has been enacted evi-
dencing the rapid adoption of the underlying principles of the Nebbia
case, 22 but it is impossible to draw from the cases any basis for prognosti-
cating what businesses might hereafter be regulated although that had
been possible in Justice Hale's day. So long as there is apparent neces-
sity for action 2' and so long as the means employed are appropriate,
18 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U. S. 262 at 302, 52 S. Ct. 371, 76 L. Ed.
747 at 766.
10291 U. S. 502, 54 S. Ct. 505, 78 L. Ed. 940, 86 A. L. R. 1469 (1934).
20 94 U. S. 113, 24 L. Ed. 77 (1877).
21 291 U. S. 502 at 536, 54 S. Ct. 505', 78 L. Ed. 940 at 956.
22 See annotation to Herrin v. Arnold. 183 Okla. 392, 82 P. (2d) 977 (1938). in
119 A. L. R. 1471, and to City of Mobile v. Rouse, 233 Ala. 622, 173 So. 266 (1937),
in 111 A. L. R. 349.
23 Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U. S. 236. 61 S. Ct. S62. 85 L. Ed. 1305 (1941), upholding
the regulation of fees charged by private employment agencies, overruled the holding
in Ribnick v. McBride, 277 U. S. 350. 48 S. Ct. 545, 72 L. Ed. 913 (1928). See also
Lamere v. City of Chicago, 391 Il1. 552, 63 N. E. (2d) 83 (1945). and Bowen v.
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regulation of private business through price control seems to be an assured
fact, so much so that even the rates charged for such personal services
as dry cleaning and laundry may be controlled.
24
The statute involved in the instant case is an excellent example. Al-
though it has been clearly established that newspapers are not public
utilities but private enterprises,2 5 still they are to be regarded as no
more immune from price control than other private businesses if such
regulation is essential in the protection of public welfare. The legislation
in question was found to be necessary, in the interest of public welfare,
to control and thus prevent corrupt political practices. As the legislature
had unquestioned authority to control the latter with a view to their
eventual elimination,2 6 it could regulate some particular device or prac-
tice through a scheme of classification not itself arbitrary or unreasonable.
2 7
As newspapers and radio stations are important devices to those with po-
litical aspirations, the only problem then left was to determine whether
control of maximum advertising rates was a reasonable method of regu-
lation.
In that regard, newspapers have heretofore been subjected to price
control under two different situations. The first might be classed as rate-
making made necessary for the carrying on of efficient and economical
government as in the case of statutes fixing a maximum rate for the
publication of assessment lists, legal notices and the like.2" As to the con-
stitutionality of statutes in this category, so long as the rate fixed permits a
reasonable return, there can be no question. The second situation includes
legislation, similar to that in the instant case, purporting to regulate prices
Hannah, 167 Tenn. 451, 71 S. W. (2d) 672 (1934). Businesses which have been
declared not to be "affected with a public interest" have been listed in an annotation
to Miami Laundry Co. v. Florida Dry Cleaning and L. Board, 134 Fla. 1, 183 So.
759 (1938), in 119 A. L. R. 985.
24 Miami Laundry Co. v. Florida Dry Cleaning and L. Board, 134 Fla. 1, 183 So.
759 (1938).
25 A discussion of this point may be found in an annotation to Commonwealth v.
Boston Transcript Co., 249 Mass. 477, 144 N. E. 400 (1924), in 35 A. L. R. 7. See
also Sharon Herald Co. v. Mercer County, 132 Pa. Super. 245, 200 A. 880 (1938).
The contrary view expressed in Uhlman v. Sherman, 22 Ohio N. P. (N. S.) 225, 31
Ohio Dec. 54 (1919), is no longer followed.
26 State v. Kohler, 200 Wis. 518, 228 N. W. 895, 69 A. L. R. 377 (1930).
27 Hartford Acci. & Indem. Co. v. Illinois, 298 U. S. 155, 56 S. Ct. 685, 80 L. Ed.
1099 (1936) ; In re Opinion of the Justices, 247 Mass. 589, 143 N. E. 808 (1924).
See also annotation to Welch Co. v. State, 89 N. H. 428, 199 A. 886 (1938), in
120 A. L. R. 282.
28 For example, IlL. Hey. Stat. 1945, Ch. 100. § 11, and Ch. 120, § 585. The latter
statute was held constitutional in D. L. Lee Pub. Co. v. St. Clair County, 341 Ill.
257, 173 N. E. 274 (1930). See also Belleville Advocate Printing Co. v. St. Clair
County, 336 Ill. 359, 168 N. E. 312 (1929).
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and other practices relating to elections and similar political activity.29
Although several such statutes exist, the instant case is the first in which
direct assault on constitutional grounds has been rejected. If the policy
behind such legislation is admittedly one designed to insure the purity of
elections, the public interest is so well-entrenched that, pursuant to the
Nebbia case, price regulation is proper. Since there is no doubt that the
right of freedom of contract is subject to reasonable restraints imposed by
the police power,"0 as is also the liberty of the press," it would seem to
follow that laws of this character will be and should be upheld elsewhere
as they would appear to meet all constitutional requirements.
R. W. BEART
TORTS-INTERFERENCE WITH OR INJURIES IN PERSONAL RELATIONS-
WHETHER OT NOT MINOR CHILD HAS A CAUSE oF ACTION AGAINST PERSON
WHO ALIENATES PARENT'S AF'FECTIONS-The precise problem, upon iden-
tical facts except for the element of diversity of citizenship, that was be-
fore the Circuit Court of Appeals in the case of Daily v. Parker' has now
been presented to an Appellate Court of Illinois through the case of
Johnson v. Luhman.2 In that action, a complaint filed on behalf of cer-
tain minors charged that the defendant induced and enticed the chil-
dren's father to desert them and breach his legal duties to his family to
the damage of the minor plaintiffs. Motion to dismiss the complaint for
failure to state a cause of action was sustained by the trial court. On appeal
by plaintiffs, it was held by the Appellate Court for the Second Dis-
trict that the complaint was sufficient, so the order dismissing the com-
plaint was reversed and the cause was remanded for further proceedings.
That court, therefore, reached the same result upon much the same grounds
as had been attained in the earlier Federal court decision.
It is not intended to canvass the entire subject again, for a com-
plete and critical commentary on the underlying basis for the doctrine
2. In addition to N. H. Laws 1945. Ch. 185. § 1 et seq.. see also Minn. Stat. 1941,
§ 211.03 and § 211.05; Miss. Code Anno. 1942, § 3176; Utah Code Anno. 1943, Tit.
25? Ch. 13, § 27.
30 Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U. S. 525, 43 S. Ct. 394, 67 L. Ed. 785 (1923)
Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U. S. 1, 35 S. Ct. 240, 59 L. Ed. 441 (1915).
31 Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson. 283 U. S. 697, 51 S. Ct. 625, 75 L. Ed. 1357
(1931). Liberty of the press primarily involves immunity from the restraints of
censorship. It may also be endangered by financial restraints. The majority of
the court in the instant case recognized this fact but said no issue had been
based thereon. The dissenting judge thought otherwise: - N. H. - at -, 48 A.
(2d) 478 at 483.
1152 F. (2d) 174 (1945).
.'330 Ill. App. 598, 71 N. E. (2d) 810 (1947).
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in the Daily case has already been published.3  Little more has been added
by the opinion of the Illinois Appellate Court in the instant case for it
rests primarily on the fundamental thesis that it is the province of the
courts to "fill in the gaps" in our system of law. It does, however, claim
some support from the recent Illinois Supreme Court decision in Heck v.
,Schupp4 which declared the so-called "heart balm" statute to be an un-
constitutional restraint upon the filing of suits for alienation of affections
by either of the spouses. Any reliance in that case on Section 19 of
Article II of the 1870 constitution was justified for the constitutional
right to "a certain remedy in the laws" clearly forbids legislative action
designed to take away an existing remedy unless, perhaps, some more
adequate one be provided in its stead. That provision, however, furnishes
no support for the holding in the instant case for there is a vast differ-
ence, apparently unrecognized, between a negative restraint placed upon
the legislative department and an affirmative command to the judicial
department to devise and provide new remedies hitherto unknown. The
constitutional provision does not, and was never designed to, go as far as
the court would seem to think.
It well may be, as the court suggests, that it is time that frank recog-
nition be taken of the changes which have occurred in the family unit,
changes which have made it into a co-operative enterprise, so that much
of the ancient law of domestic relations is anachronistic. The short and
simple answer is that, if such changes are to be produced, the job is one
for the legislature which has competently handled the subject in the past,
rather than for the courts. Such, at least, is the view of the Circuit
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. It has, in the recent case
of McMillan v. Twylor,5 refused to follow the views of its sister Circuit
Court in the Daily case by dismissing a suit of this character on the
ground that such a cause of action is not yet recognized in the law. It
is obvious, then, that the last word on the subject still remains to be
spoken.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION--PROCEEDINGS TO SECURE CO-MPENSATION-
WHETHER REVIEW OF ARBITRATOR'S AWARD BY INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION Is
PREREQUISITE TO REVIEW BEFORE A COURT-In Sweitzer v. Industrial Com-
mission,' a question arose as to whether or not one who seeks judicial re-
3 See All. A. Heind, "A Remedy for All Injuries?", 25 CHICAGO-KENT ,AVW REVIEW
PO (1946).
4394 111. 296, 68 N. E. (2d) 464 (1946).
5160 F. (2d) 221 (1046).
1 394 I1. 141, 68 N. E. (2d) 290 (1944).
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view of a decision under the Illinois Workmen's Compensation Act 2 must
exhaust his administrative remedies before being privileged to appeal to
the courts. The claimant therein was awarded compensation by an ar-
bitrator but, as neither party petitioned the Industrial Commission for
review within the required period of time,' the decision of the arbitrator
became the decision of the Commission by operation of law. The claim-
ant thereafter, in apt time, sought a statutory writ of certiorari. The
employer moved to quash the writ but its motion was denied and the cir-
cuit court thereafter reviewed the proceedings, set the award aside and
entered judgment on its own findings, which judgment favored the claim-
ant. The employer then secured writ of error from the Supreme Court,
where it was held that if the claimant was dissatisfied with the decision
of the arbitrator he should have sought review before the Commission and,
for failure to exhaust his administrative remedies, the award had be-
come final so that the courts were lacking in jurisdiction to review. The
judgment was, therefore, reversed.
In the last case in point prior to the instant one, that of Jakub v.
Industrial Commission,4 it had been held, under the then existing statute,5
that the courts were given jurisdiction to review, without the necessity
of any internal action by the Industrial Commission, so long as the award
of the arbitrator had become the final decision of the commission by op-
eration of law. Paragraph one of Section 19(f) of the statute at that
time declared that the decision "of the Industrial Board, acting within
its powers, according to the provisions of paragraph (e) of this Section,
and of the arbitrator or committee of arbitration, where no review is
had and his or their decision becomes the decision of the Industrial Board
in accordance with the provisions of this section, shall, in the absence of
fraud, be conclusive unless reviewed as in this paragraph hereinafter
provided. "6 The third paragraph thereof stated that the court might
"confirm or set aside the decision of the arbitrator or comnittee of arbitra-
tion or Industrial Board." '7  As the law then read, there was evident
support for the holding in the Jakub case.
Immediately after that decision, the first and third paragraphs of Sec-
tion 19(f) were amended by the legislature by omitting those portions
above italicized so that thereafter paragraph one read: "The decision of the
industrial commission acting within its powers, according to the pro-
2 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945. Ch. 48, § 138 et seq.
3 Ibid., § 156(b).
4 288 Ill. 87, 123 N. E. 263 (1919).
5 Laws 1917, p. 488, § 19.
6 Ibid., p. 501, § 19(f). Italics added.
7 Ibid., p. 501, § 19(f). para. 3. Italics added.
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visions of paragraph (e) of this section shall, in the absence of fraud, be
conclusive, unless reviewed as in this paragraph hereinafter provided,'8
and the third paragraph read: "The court may confirm or set aside the
decision of the industrial commission . . . . "9 In addition, Section
19(b), which provides the procedure for obtaining review of the arbi-
trator's award before the Industrial Commission, was amended so as to
provide that unless a petition for review was perfected as therein speci-
fied the decision should not only become the decision of the Industrial
Commission but, in the absence of fraud, should also be conclusive.10
These revisions have remained since that time without any further change
and constitute the important statutory provisions here concerned.
Since these amendments, it has been held that the method of review
provided by Section 19(f) is exclusive,1 that the power of the Industrial
Commission to review the award of an arbitrator is conditioned upon the
prompt filing of both a petition for review and a transcript of evidence
before the arbitrator within the respective time periods fixed by the
statute, -12 and also that the jurisdiction of the circuit courts to review in
compensation cases is wholly statutory, hence is limited by the provisions
of the Workmen's Compensation Act." While the courts have consis-
tently held that the statutory provisions must be followed precisely to
perfect a review, no decision prior to the instant one has construed the
statute to require a properly perfected review of an award of the ar-
bitrator by the Industrial Commission to be a condition precedent to the
right to secure review of such award before the courts.
The doctrine requiring strict construction of statutory provisions re-
lating to the review of decisions of administrative tribunals, requiring
as it does the exhaustion of all such administrative remedies prior to
application to the courts for relief, now seems well settled and has been
extended to all branches of administrative activities. 14  Expounded by
Justice Holmes in United States v. Sing Tuck," an immigration case,
the doctrine was later affirmed in Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Company,"6
a rate-fixing case, and has since been applied generally to procedure be-
s Laws 1919, p. 547, § 19(f).
q The third paragraph, as rewritten, appears as Laws 1919, p. 547, § 19(f) (2).
1o Laws 1919, p. 547, § 19(b).
11 St. Louis Pressed Steel Co. v. Schorr, 303 IlM. 476. 135 N. E. 766 (1922).
120elsner v. Industrial Commission, 305 Il1. 158, 137 N. E. 116 (1922).
13 Nierman v. Industrial Commission, 329 li. 623, 161 N. E. 115 (1928).
1442 Am. Jur., Public Administrative Law, §§ 197-202. See also Berger. Ex-
haustion of Administrative Remedies, 48 Yale L. J. 981 (1939), and note in 35
Col. L. Rev. 231.
15 194 U. S. 161, 24 S. Ct. 621. 48 L. Ed. 917 (1904).
16211 U. S. 210, 29 S. Ct. 67. 53 L. Ed. 150 (1908).
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fore federal administrative agencies. It has been applied in this state to
tax'- and other administrative proceedings.' s Statutory provisions requir-
ing rehearing and review of its own decisions by the promulgating agency
as a condition precedent to judicial review have been given mandatory
effect in some jurisdictions,"9 while in others the appellate administrative
agency has been allowed to waive review and permit direct appeal to
the courts even though the statute requires an order of that agency from
which to appeal.20  As applied to workmen's compensation cases, the
doctrine has been given effect under statutes fundamentally similar to
that found here..
2 1
The recently adopted Administrative Review Act2 2 also makes ex-
haustion of administrative remedies mandatory in proceedings in which
that statute is applicable. 23  While not specifically applicable to work-
men's compensation cases, the statute is indicative of a legislative intent
to require exhaustion of administrative remedies and gives some support
to the construction achieved in the instant case. The Federal Adminis-
trative Procedure Act,2-4 on the other hand, permits direct appeal to the
courts from any level of the administrative process unless the enabling
statute or the rules of the administrative agency specifically require ex-
17 Adsit v. Lieb, 76 II. 198 (1875), as applied to personal property assessments;
Mississippi Valley Life Ins. Co. v. Storm, 339 Ill. 245, 171 N. E. 134 (1930), as
to corporation capital stock assessments; Bistor v. McDonough, 348 Ill. 624, 181
N. E. 417 (1932), as to apportionment of tax between real and personal property;
Kinderman v. Harding, 345 I1. 237, 178 N. E. 71 (1931), as to real property assess-
ments: Wabash E. Ry. Co. v. Com'rs East Lake Fork Sp. Drain. Dist., 134 Ill.
384, 25 N. E. 781 (1890), as to drainage district assessments.
18 See Cann v. City of Chicago, 241 Ill. App. 21 (1926), for example, as to zon-
ing regulations.
10 Brown v. Colorado Fuel & Iron Corp., 111 Colo. 253, 140 P. (2d) 619 (1943).
20 See, for example, Tucker v. Alexander, 275 U. S. 228, 48 S. Ct. 45. 72 L. Ed.
253 (1927).
21 Tigertail Quarries. Inc. v. Ward, 154 Fla. 122, 16 So. (2d) 812 (1944) ; Jarman
v. Collins-Hill Lumber & Coal Co., 226.Iowa 1247, 286 N. W. 526 (1939) : Hollowell
v. North Carolina Dept. of Conservation. 201 N. C. 616, 161 S. E. 89 (1931) ; Riddle
v. Fairforest Finishing Co.. 198 S. C. 419. 18 S. E. (2d) 341 (1942) ; Gray v. Under-
wood Bros., 167 Va. 213. 188 S. E. 151 (1936) ; Wickman v. Industrial Commission,
237 Wis. 13, 296 N. W. 78 (1941).
22 Il1. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 110, § 264 et seq.
23 Ibid., § 265. An exception is made as to those cases where the jurisdiction
of the administrative agency over the person or subject matter is in dispute. In
these instances, in order to have the matter settled judicially at the earliest
moment, appeal is permitted as to this issue only from a final decision rendered
at any level of the administrative process. For this purpose, decisions are defined
as being final even though the agency's enabling statute or its rules permit or re-
quire exhaustion of administrative remedies: Ibid., § 264. However, if application
for a rehearing or review within the agency is made, the decision is deemed not
final as to the person making such application. By this procedural limitation con-
current appeals, to the court and to the higher level of the agency, are precluded.
24 5 U. S. C. A. § 1001 et seq.
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haustion of administrative remedies. 25  Where exhaustion of remedy is
not specifically required, judicial construction may become necessary but
there is a tendency on the part of the federal courts to insist upon it
before they will assume jurisdiction.
The basis for the doctrine has been attributed to a variety of sources
but, whatever the reason given during the period of its development, it
has resulted in eliminating the possibility of contestants having a choice
(if remedy or procedure. It incorporates the multifarious administrative
tribunals into the judicial hierarchy, thereby fostering orderly procedure.
Its extension has been and will be a boon to the proper handling of com-
plex administrative problems. The decision in the instant case, therefore,
not only dispels doubts which have existed as to the proper construction
to be given to Section 19 of the Illinois Workmen's Compensation Act
2 6
but may also serve to indicate an attitude on the part of the court so
that similar holdings are likely to follow as to other administrative
agencies not expressly covered by statutory provision on the subject.
R. C. MONTGOMERY
225 U. S. C. A. § 1001(c).
" See Angerstein, Appellate Procedure in Workmen's Compensation Cass, 2:3
CIIICA o-KENT LAw REVIEW 205 (1945), particularly p. 209.
